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United States Oceans Politics
ANN L. HOLLICK*
The United States Government has been actively engaged since
1967 in the formulation of policy relating to the control and use of
the oceans involving a network of issues that surrounds the exploi-
tation of the seabed, the breadth of the territorial sea, transit rights
through straits, and the conservation and allocation of fishery re-
sources. Few issues of foreign policy impinge on such a complex
array of national and commercial interests in the United States and
abroad and at the same time involve such a complex interaction of
interests and perspectives within the U. S. Government.
At the heart of these ocean issues and of the debate on the law
of the sea is the allocation and use of ocean space. In a broad sense,
the contending parties are coastal economic interests versus global
maritime interests. Governments as well as private interests may
* Executive Director, Ocean Policy Project; Assistant Professor, .Ameri-
can Foreign Policy, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns
Hopkins University, Washington, D.C. Dr. Hollick has been active in the
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tion of U.S. policy and was completed in August, 1971 (Ph.D., Johns Hop-
kins University 1971). She has participated in a number of national and
international ocean affairs conferences and has attended the preparatory
sessions of the U.N. Seabed Committee.
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espouse either a coastal or a maritime policy or a combination of
the two. The natural alliances, therefore, transcend national bound-
aries. Such alliances may link U. S. petroleum interests seeking
national jurisdiction over extended offshore areas with Latin Amer-
ican nations claiming a 200 mile jurisdiction. Or they may bind
naval establishments of maritime nations with land locked coun-
tries anxious to restrict the claims of coastal nations. Perhaps the
most pronounced division is between developed nations with global
maritime interests and developing nations anxious to curb the ac-
tivities of maritime powers off their coasts.
Since 1967, the forum for international negotiations between
these contending forces has been the U.N. Seabed Committee.' In
1970, the Seabed Committee was officially designated as the pre-
paratory body for the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Con-
ference.2 The conference is scheduled to begin with a two week
organizational session in November/December 1973 in New York
to be followed by an eight week session in Santiago, Chile, during
April and May of 1974. The agenda items for the conference are
numerous and include the issues of an international regime for the
seabed, the breadth of the territorial sea, coastal state preferential
rights over resources beyond the territorial sea, straits used for in-
ternational navigation, the preservation of the marine environment
and scientific research.
While the United States is obviously the world's foremost mari-
time power, given its twvo long coastlines and its Hawaiian and
Alaskan archipelagos, it is also a nation with substantial coastal
interests.3 U.S. ocean policy is, therefore, characterized by a high
degree of conflict between coastal and maritime interests and rep-
resents a series of tenuous compromises. Since the first announce-
ments in 1970 of U.S. policies on seabed resource exploitation and
other law of the sea issues, the policy compromises have evolved
steadily away from ones favoring military-strategic interests to
ones favoring coastal economic interests. This evolution has been
due in part to international pressure and in part to an increase in
policy influence of domestic interest groups with substantial coastal
state concerns.
As announced in August 1970, United States policy with respect
to the exploitation of seabed minerals favored a narrow zone of
1. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor
beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.
2. G.A. Res. 2750 (1970), 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs 224 (.1971).
3. Indeed, under a universal 200 mile territorial sea, the United States
would gain more territory than any other nation.
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national jurisdiction and the establishment of an international sea-
bed regime beyond.4 Exclusive coastal state control over the min-
eral resources of the Continental Shelf would extend only to the
200 meter isobath. Beyond that, in an intermediate zone reaching
to the outer edge of the continental margin, the coastal state would
act as a "trustee" for the international seabed authority. In the
deep seabed the international authority would license the exploi-
tation of minerals, and a substantial portion of the revenues gen-
erated in the international area (including the intermediate zone)
would be distributed to developing nations.
Since the announcement of this policy three years ago, there has
been a discernible shift in U. S. policy away from insistence that
national jurisdiction be limited to the 200 meter isobath; increas-
ingly evident is an accommodation to strong international and do-
mestic pressures in favor of a broader national resource or eco-
nomic zone. Although the U.S. has never explicitly abandoned the
200 meter isobath as the limit to coastal state seabed jurisdiction,
it no longer insists on it in policy statements. Instead the Govern-
ment simply delineates the provisions that must apply in coastal
zones of national resource jurisdiction. In such areas, the U.S. now
insists on international agreement to certain standards and provi-
sions for compulsory dispute settlement to protect other uses of the
area, and to safeguard the integrity of investments. These condi-
tions are, of course, acceptable to U.S. domestic interests planning
to operate in coastal areas.
On the second set of major policy issues before the United
States Government there has been a similar movement toward
greater concessions for coastal interests. The American position on
the breadth of the territorial sea, international straits, and fisheries
was presented to the U.N. Seabed Committee in August 1971.5 The
U.S. Government indicated that it was prepared to agree to a twelve
mile territorial sea provided that international agreement was
reached on freedom of transit through and over international straits
that would otherwise be closed by this extension of the territorial
sea. At the same time, the United States was prepared to accept
limited preferential rights for coastal nations over the fishery re-
4. Draft United Nations Convention in the International Seabed Area,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/25; 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs 1046 (1970).
5. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.H/L.4, 65 Dep't. State Bull. 261 (1971).
sources off their shores. In the two years since this announcement,
there has been little modification of the U.S. position on straits and
the territorial sea. The U.S. fishery position, however, has evolved
to one of acceptance of coastal state management of coastal and
anadromous species of fish.
One cannot understand the U. S. position on these ocean issues
without understanding the pressures and concessions produced by
diverse national and commercial interests as they interact with
these same kinds of interests in other countries. These pressures
and concessions are transmitted through a policy process that ulti-
mately shapes the U.S. position. Although the process of formu-
lating ocean policy is in many ways distinctive, it nonetheless illu-
minates some perennial features of the foreign policy decision-mak-
ing process, with particular reference in this case to the Nixon
Administration and the operation of its National Security Council.
Perhaps the most fruitful approach to understanding how ocean
policy is formulated is that of bureaucratic politics. In this ap-
proach the actors or "makers" of ocean policy are public officials
and large bureaucracies engaged in a continuous process of bargain-
ing which is influenced throughout by domestic interests as well as
foreign interests. The ocean policies that result are a product of
contention-within the Government and with domestic and foreign
interests-and not of a rational centralized decision-making process.0
Several low-level generalizations or lessons emerge from a bu-
reaucratic politics approach to ocean policy. First, it is apparent
that the ocean policy process involves a blend of domestic and for-
eign policy considerations. As domestic interests have become
more involved in the process, the foreign policy latitude of both the
State Department and White House has diminished correspond-
ingly. While decisions and policies on the oceans have remained
a product of conflict and compromise, the active participation of
domestic interests has restricted the process of tradeoffs. Bureau-
crats that initially interjected themselves into a variety of ocean
issues now limit their policy involvement to issues of direct rele-
vance to their agency.
The policy process has been characterized by contention between
interests with varying degrees of political and economic power.
6. The bureaucratic politics approach to foreign policy is most articu-
lately elaborated in Allison, Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile
Crisis, 63 Am. POL. Sci. REV. - (1970); Halperin, Why Bureaucrats Play
Games, - FoR. POL. (1971); Allison and Halperin, Bureaucratic Poli-
tics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications, 24 WoRm PoL. - (Sup-
plement) (19.).
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The most powerful private interest in the seabed debate has been
the petroleum industry. Equally powerful and initially in opposi-
tion to petroleum has been the Defense Department, representing
more traditional foreign policy considerations regarding use of the
oceans. What emerges from an examination of the policy role of
these and other ocean interest groups is the not-too-surprising fact
that an interest's influence on policy is a function of its economic
and political power T-of its contacts within the bureaucracy, the
Congress and the White House, of its ability to glean information,
and of the skill of its policy partisans.
A number of generalizations flow from a consideration of the
ocean policy of the Nixon NSC system. While the NSC system pre-
sided over by Henry Kissinger has ensured that contentious ocean
policy questions come to the White House for resolution, counter-
vailing factors have allowed lower level bureaucrats to retain sub-
stantial policy control. The process leading up to a White House
decision, and even the decision itself, may be largely determined
by the skill of contending bureaucrats in formulating and present-
ing options for Presidential consideration. Then, of course, the
implementation of policy, once a Presidential decision is reached,
allows the bureaucrat substantial freedom from White House super-
vision. This has been especially true of ocean policy where the
subject is relatively technical and its urgency has not been self
evident to high level officials. Due in large part to the complexity
of the issues, the ocean bureaucrat tends to deal exclusively with
ocean questions. This not only results in a rather closed group of
interacting policy experts but also tends to insulate these decision-
makers from close White House scrutiny.
UNITED STATES SEABED PoLIcY
The Policy Participants
Of the domestic interests affected by the disposition of the seabed
and its mineral resources, only four have had a significant influence
on or involvement in policy formulation through 1972-the petro-
leum industry, the military, the hard minerals industry, and the
marine science community. While the military and the scientist
7. Tables 1 and 2 provide a rough index of priorities accorded to agen-
cies and ocean uses by the Federal Government. See pp. 500, 501, infra.
use the oceans for the more traditional purposes of mobility, the
petroleum and hard minerals industries share a more recent inter-
est in the exploitation of fixed mineral resources. The resulting
clash between these new and traditional ocean uses has been a cen-
tral element in the formulation of U.S. seabed policy.
Seabed policy has two major aspects: (1) the delimitation of
national jurisdiction over seabed minerals and (2) the nature of
the seabed regime to be established beyond national jurisdiction.
Each of the four interest groups is concerned with different aspects
of seabed policy. While the petroleum industry is primarily intent
upon determining the location of the boundary of national jurisdic-
tion, the hard minerals industry is concerned with the seabed re-
gime to be established beyond that boundary. The military and the
marine scientist are affected by both of these questions insofar as
they might restrict their mobility on the oceans. Conflict has
therefore arisen over both the national boundary and the interna-
tional regime issues-between Defense and the petroleum industry
in the former case and between Defense and the hard minerals in-
dustry in the latter. The clash over the boundary issue began ear-
lier than that over the regime and was much more virulent, due in
no small measure to the relative power parity of defense and petro-
leum interests. Only in 1972 did the Department of Defense with-
draw from active involvement in the boundary issue to concen-
trate on the straits question.
The policy dispute over the boundary found its origin in the
1968 discovery that seabed petroleum deposits are generally lim-
mited to the continental margin. Although offshore petroleum
operations had been underway for over two decades, they were
confined to the shallow areas of the continental shelf and knowl-
edge of the area beyond was at best vague. In 1967 and early 1968,
new discoveries and developments led the petroleum industry to
reevaluate its interest in the deeper offshore areas. The Malta pro-
posal at the United Nations s raised worldwide hopes of boundless
seabed treasure while simultaneously threatening to jeopardize na-
tional access to them. In the same period, estimates of the magni-
tude of offshore petroleum resources were skyrocketing as tech-
nological advances were lowering the cost of deep water operations.
Important in unifying the entire petroleum industry around a
8. Declaration and Treaty Concerning the Reservation Exclusively for
Peaceful Purposes of the Sea-Bed and of the Ocean Floor Underlying the
Seas Beyond the Limits of Present National Jurisdiction, and the Use of
their Resources in the Interests of Mankind, 22 U.N. GAOR -, U.N. Doc.
A/6695 (1967).
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single position on offshore jurisdiction were two reports emanating
from the U.S. Geological Survey in early 1968. In the first, the
Director of the Geological Survey indicated that commercial petro-
leum deposits would be restricted to the continental margin and
suggested that the legal definition of the Continental Shelf should
be adapted to correspond with the geological boundaryY The im-
pact of this statement on subsequent petroleum policy was rein-
forced by new and substantially increased estimates of offshore
petroleum resources. The Geological Survey reported recoverable
reserves on the U. S. continental margins ranging from 180 to 220
billion barrels of petroleum liquids and from 820 to 1,100 trillion
cubic feet of gas.10
On the basis of these findings, major segments of the U.S. petro-
leum industry moved quickly to stake out a policy position on the
location of the Continental Shelf boundary. The National Petro-
leum Council offered a definitive policy formulation in the interim
report entitled Petroleum Resources under the Ocean Floor.1 The
NPC's argumentation combined an ingenious early version of a na-
tional "energy crisis" with elaborate legal reasoning. Using the
Interior Department's estimates, the NPC pointed to the substan-
tial resources off U.S. shores and advanced the view that it was
vital to the nation's security to guarantee national control of all the
energy resources of the continental margin. The alternative, it
was suggested, would be a dangerous dependence on foreign sup-
plies of petroleum.
To secure national control of these offshore petroleum resources,
the U.S. Government was urged to unilaterally assert sovereign
rights over offshore seabed resources to the outer edge of the con-
tinental margin. Such a move, the petroleum industry argued,
would be consistent with the intent of the Geneva Convention on
9. U.S. Dept. of the Interior (Geological Survey), Geologic Boundary at
the Continents, (Statement of W. T. Pecora) (Feb. 21, 1968).
10. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, McKelvey, et at., Potential Mineral Re-
sources of the United States Outer Continental Shelf, Unpublished Report
of the Geological Survey to the Public Land Law Review Commission,
March, 1968. A year later the Geological Survey estimated potential
reserves in place to a depth of 200 meters to be 660-780 billion barrels of
oil and 1,640-2,200 trillion cubic feet of natural gas with reserves of the
same magnitude from 200 to 2500 meter isobath.
11. Published July, 1968; the final report came out in March, 1969.
the Continental Shelf and would in no way impair high seas free-
doms in the area. According to Article I of the 1958 Geneva Con-
vention, coastal state jurisdiction over seabed resources, or the
limit of the legal Continental Shelf, extends to the 200 meter (656
feet) isobath or beyond that to the depth that admits of exploita-
tion. Although in 1969 producing wells were operating well within
the 200 meter isobath (340 feet), exploratory wells were being
drilled at depths far exceeding this limit (1,300 feet) .12 Adding
the expected advance of recovery capabilities to the geological
break between the margin and the deep seabed, the industry con-
tended that the intent of the Geneva Convention was to advance
the Continental Shelf boundary to the outer limit of the continental
margin. Underlying the early petroleum position was the tradi-
tional belief shared by both the domestic and overseas branches of
the petroluem industry that in gaining access to resources off the
U.S. coasts as well as off those of other nations it was safer and
more profitable for American firms to deal bilaterally with coastal
nations rather than with an unfamiliar international regime pos-
sibly weighted against U.S. interests.13
As the petroleum industry began to advance this position within
the Government, the Defense Department position on the boundary
moved in the opposite direction. The military observed that the
Interior Department's issuing of leases at depths far greater than
the 200 meter isobath constituted de facto extension of the U.S.
Continental Shelf based on the exploitability clause of the Geneva
Convention. Although under the terms of the Continental Shelf
Convention resource jurisdiction was not to affect other uses of the
area, the military came increasingly to fear that such would not be
the case. Not only was it concerned about the effect of such exten-
sions on the placement of ASW detection devices, but Defense was
equally fearful that the limited resource sovereignty delegated to
a coastal state would gradually expand, through the phenomenon
of "creeping jurisdiction," to claims of total territorial sovereignty.
Thus the military came to the view that the seaward extension of
the Continental Shelf boundary as exploitation proceeded, together
with the expansion of coastal state sovereignty over superjacent
waters, would ultimately close off U.S. military access to coastal
areas around the world.
.12. Hearings Special Study on United Nations Suboceanic Lands Policy
Before Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1969).
13. For the most articulate public statements of this view within the
Government, See: 116 CONG. REC. 12240-42 (1970) (remarks of Senator
Hansen); 116 CONG. REC. 22169 (1970) (remarks of Congressman Bush).
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At that time the Defense Department solution to the threat of
creeping jurisdiction was to attempt to limit the size of special pur-
pose or resource zones in the oceans. Constrained from a resort to
force to protect its navigational rights from coastal state encroach-
ment, Defense Department representatives opted for a broad inter-
national agreement through a formal conference. With regard to
seabed minerals, the Defense Department sought international
agreement on a Continental Shelf extending no farther than the
200 meter isobath. To sell such a scheme to governments of de-
veloping nations the Defense Department proposed the establish-
ment of a generous and powerful seabed mineral regime in the
area beyond the narrow Continental Shelf.14 In an unsuccessful
effort to convince the skeptical petroleum industry of the merits of
such a boundary, the Defense Department pointed out that 92% of
the world's continental margins were off foreign shores. To gain
access to these, it was far better for the petroleum industry to deal
with an impartial international seabed authority than to deal bi-
laterally with unpredictable national governments that might re-
sort to harassment, profit squeezing or outright expropriation.15
The technological superiority of the American petroleum industry
and the dominant role that the U.S. Government would probably
play in an international seabed authority would presumably assure
favorable treatment for U.S. companies.
Inherent in the policy position that Defense was advancing within
the Government was a readiness to risk the petroleum industry's
resource interests, as industry saw them, in return for internation-
ally agreed rights of transit. The industry was predictably opposed
to such a tradeoff and fought it vigorously through the Interior
Department. The petroleum industry's ready access to informa-
tion and to policy makers within the Government contributed to
its effective and early input into the policy process.
The hard minerals and marine science interests were less fortu-
nate. Throughout 1969 and 1970 neither hard minerals nor science
was adequately represented in the closely-held policy deliberations
14. For public statements of these points see: HENxI and RAmN,
LAW OF =H SEA: UNITED NATIONS AND OCEAN MANAGEMENT 19, 325-27
(L. M. Alexander ed.) (1971).
15. Ratiner, National Security Interests in Ocean Space, 4 NAT. REs.
LAw 582 (1971).
within the Government. The primary concern of the hard minerals
industry with seabed policy has been with the nature of the regime
rather than with the location of the Continental Shelf boundary.
Of interest to the ocean miner is the manganese nodule, a dark
potato-shaped accretion containing varying amounts of a large
number of metals such as cobalt, nickel, copper, manganese, iron,
silicone and aluminum. While manganese nodules are scattered
widely over the deep floor, the nodules with the greatest propor-
tion of commercially attractive cobalt, nickel and cooper are gen-
erally found in the deepest parts of the oceans (at depths as great
as 18,000 feet).16 Because nodules of commercial value are rarely
found on the continental margin, locating the national Continental
Shelf boundary at any point up to the outer edge of the margin will
not significantly effect the miner of nodules.
First discovered in the 1870's, the manganese nodule came to be
considered as a potential resource only recently. As information
about nodules has increased, mining industry policy has undergone
several transitions-from early support for a broad Continental
Shelf, to a policy of a moving Shelf boundary, to a total disregard
of the boundary issue and a strong position on the regime beyond
national jurisdiction. In August 1968 the petroleum and hard min-
erals industries were in substantial agreement on the boundary
question as was reflected in a Joint Report sent to the American
Bar Association House of Delegates by the Sections of Natural Re-
sources Law, International and Comparative Law, and the Standing
Committee on Peace and Law through the United Nations. The
Joint Report supported the National Petroleum Council view that
the rights of coastal states to the minerals of the seabed already
extended to the foot of the continental margin. The Report also
considered it premature to consider establishing a regime for the
seabed beyond that boundary.
By 1969 the hard mineral interest group began to move away
from this position. In an August 1969 Joint Report by the same
Section of the American Bar Association, the split was evident.
The new Joint Report explicitly stated that some members no
longer supported the interpretation of the Continental Shelf bound-
ary that had been advocated a year before. Instead these members
argued that the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf "ex-
tends sovereign rights over the seabed beyond the 200 meter line
16. Brooks, Deep Sea Manganese Nodules: From Scientific Phenomenon
to World Resources, 8 NAT. REs. L. 406 (1968); Rothstein, Deep Ocean
Mining: Today and Tomorrow, 6 CoLum. J. WoaiD Bus. - (1971).
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only as technological progress makes exploitation in that area pos-
sible in fact."1
This diverging position on the Continental Shelf boundary coin-
cided with increased industry interest in the recovery of mangan-
ese nodules and increased knowledge of the location of commer-
cially attractive deposits. Although the mineral industry shared
the petroleum industry's aversion to international administrative
organizations, it came gradually to realize that mining companies
would be operating in areas beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion, no matter where the Continental Shelf boundary was drawn.
Ocean miners became increasingly concerned, therefore, with the
nature of the seabed regime which would govern deep sea exploi-
tation-a concern which was not shared by the petroleum interest
group given petroleum's stand on the extent of national seabed
jurisdiction.
Despite the lack of a direct interest in the boundary issue, the
hard minerals industry continued to involve itself in the boundary
dispute for tactical purposes in 1969 and 1970. The industry was
willing to support a narrow but outward moving boundary, if such
a boundary could be used to buy a satisfactory seabed regime.' 8 By
a "satisfactory regime," the hard minerals industry meant a system
of freedom to explore the seabed, to stake a claim and to receive
an exclusive license to exploit the claimed area. An international
authority, in this view, should be no more than a registry agency,
17. A.B.A., Non-Living Resources of the Sea (A Critique), 2 NAT. RES.
LAw. 429 (1969).
18. Hearings on Outer Continental Shelf Before the Senate Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess. [Hearings]
pt. I, at 136 (1969) (statement of John G. Laylin): "[T]hose who have
primarily in mind of the extraction of oil are interested only in the area
landward of the foot of the continental slope. They have been informed, it
would appear, that there is little likelihood of oil pools below the bed
of the deep sea. In consequence they are not concerned with the regime
to be established for the deep sea bed. It does not matter to them that
their demands may hurt the efforts of the United States to bring about a
satisfactory regime for the deep sea.
"In contrast .. . [those] . . .who have in mind the interests of hard
metal miners find themselves agreeing with many of the contentions of
the Navy and the scientists. They do not object to a broad shelf, but they
do object to sacrificing the chances of reaching agreement on a satis-
factory deep sea regime by insisting willy nilly that the United States
now take the position that the outer limit of the shelf is now at the foot of
the continental slope."
and its financial exactions should be minimal. Although the min-
ing industry was willing to trade the petroleum industry's interest
in the boundary for a favorable seabed authority, it soon found the
Defense Department to be a dangerous ally. To induce other na-
tions to agree to a narrow Continental Shelf, Defense was urging
the establishment of a generous and powerful seabed regime to ad-
minister the exploration and exploitation of seabed resources and
to allocate substantial revenues from these activities to an interna-
tional development fund. Despite its opposition to the Defense
Department position, the hard minerals industry was not partic-
ularly successful in blocking it. Due to its position on the bound-
ary, the hard minerals interest had lost the support of the petro-
leum industry. And within the Interior Department, hard min-
erals had to compete with petroleum for the time and energy of
government bureaucrats responsible for seabed policy.
The problems of the marine science interest were somewhat dif-
ferent. Because the marine scientist shares the military's interest
in unrestricted access to the world's oceans, he is concerned both
with the boundary and with the regime. However, the scientific
community believes it can and should distinguish its research in
the oceans from commercial and military investigations. In all
ocean policy efforts, therefore, the scientist has sought to include
explicit guarantees for open scientific research. Such guarantees,
however, necessarily imply the absence of a similar freedom of
military access for research, monitoring and even transit. They
were, therefore, strongly resisted by the military.
The policy position advocated by the United States in 1970, with
its strong emphasis on maintaining ocean freedoms, was consonant
with the scientific interest. While State Department officials rep-
resenting science and, to a lesser extent, the National Science
Foundation were in substantial agreement on the needs of science,
they were unable to override military opposition to explicit guar-
antees for freedom of scientific research. The scientific commu-
nity, therefore, failed to secure inclusion of the coveted guarantees
for scientific freedom in the U. S. Draft Seabed Treaty of 1970.
An aditional interest which has not been mentioned, and one
with limited influence on ocean policy until 1970, was that of the
Department of State itself-the Government's official foreign pol-
icy arm. The State Department's guiding purpose has been to ad-
vance U.S. ocean interests in international negotiations while main-
taining ordered and harmonious relations with other nations on a
broad range of ocean issues. Its overriding bias is toward reaching
an international agreement. To achieve these objectives the De-
[VOL. 10: 467, 1973] United States Oceans Politics
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
partment of State seeks to maintain control over the formulation
of ocean policy. This in turn has required strenuous efforts to
resolve domestic contention over ocean issues to arrive at a policy
position acceptable to all parties. When the seabed issue was first
introduced in the United Nations in 1967, the State Department
encountered a series of obstacles to the achievement of its objec-
tiVes. These impediments placed the Department in the unenvia-
ble position of having to stall in the face of growing international
pressures. The first difficulty was that of resolving internal bu-
reaucratic contention over control of ocean policy. This was tem-
porarily resolved in February 1970 when the then Legal Advisor,
John R. Stevenson, became the head of a consolidated Law of the
Sea Task Force.19 With Mr. Stevenson's retirement from govern-
ment in January 1973, the issue of directing overall U. S. ocean
policy has been once again raised.
A second difficulty in formulating early seabed policy was the
growing dispute between the Departments of Interior and Defense.
In a successful effort to forestall the imposition of a boundary pol-
icy by the State Department, the Department of Defense requested
an Under Secretaries Committee review of the seabed boundary
question. In response to this request, the White House issued a
National Security Study Memorandum in April 196920 proposing
that, in the absence of inter-agency agreement, the Under Secre-
taries Committee meet to consider the position that the United
States should take in the United Nations regarding the location of
the Continental Shelf boundary. The NSSM further proposed that
the Under Secretaries Committee attempt to reconcile the U.S.
position on the Continental Shelf boundary with that on the
territorial sea and related issues.
Between the April, 1969 NSSM and the January, 1970 meeting of
the Under Secretaries Committee, the State Department intensified
its efforts to reach a compromise acceptable to both sides. To ac-
commodate the interests of both the Department of Defense and
the Department of the Interior, the State Department proposed the
19. A useful discussion of the role of the legal advisor within the De-
partment of State may be found in Bilder, The Office of the Legal Ad-
visor: The State Department Lawyer and Foreign Affairs, 56 -Am. J.
INT'L L. 633-84 (1962).
20. The date of the Seabed N.S.S.M. given by John P. Leacacos is April
11, 1969. See Leacacos, Kissinger's Apparat, - FOR. POL. 25 (1972).
adoption of an intermediate zone in the disputed area between the
200 meter isobath and the edge of the continental margin. In this
zone, the coastal nation would enjoy control over the exploration
and exploitation of seabed resources. While responsible for enforc-
ing standards to protect against pollution and navigation hazards,
the coastal nation would not have the right to exclude other na-
tions from conducting scientific research or military activities on
the continental margin beyond the 200 meter isobath. The State
Department compromise further stipulated that a small royalty of
2% based on the value of resources exploited in the zone would be
paid to an international community fund.
The State Department compromise proposal received a mixed
reception. While Interior did not object to it strenuously, the
Defense Department rejected it flatly. Defense argued that an
intermediate zone would be temporary at best and that giving the
coastal state exclusive jurisdiction over resource exploitation on
the continental margin would jeopardize the freedom of other na-
tions to use that area for other purposes. Explicit guarantees of
access for military or scientific purposes, Defense argued, would
simply not be acceptable to coastal nations. Only by combining a
narrow Continental Shelf with a satisfactory international regime
would there be any chance of halting the proliferation of unilateral
national claims.
The NSC System
With this final failure to reach agreement, the Under Secretaries
Committee meeting was scheduled for January 29, 1970, and the
major contenders assiduously recruited allies within the bureau-
cracy. Interior consolidated the backing of the Commerce Depart-
ment and won the added support of the Bureau of the Budget and
John Ehrlichman's White House staff. The Defense Department
found backing within the Justice Department and the National
Security Council (while continuing to lobby in the State Depart-
ment for a revision of its proposal). And, in back of its interme-
diate zone proposal, the State Department lined up the Transpor-
tation Department and the National Science Foundation.
Given the obvious power of the major antagonists-the petro-
leum industry and the military-allies seemed scarcely necessary
to ensure that the Under Secretaries Committee would not render
a judgment adverse to either interest. In any case, under the NSC
options system the Committee did not have the power to impose a
decision. Chaired by then Under Secretary of State Elliott Rich-
ardson, the Committee's mandate was limited to submitting a re-
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port to Presidential Assistant Henry Kissinger, for review and con-
sideration by the President.21 The result of the meeting, therefore,
was a foregone conclusion. While the pros and cons of the State,
Interior and Defense positions were heatedly discussed, they were
not resolved. The only decision taken was to send the policy dis-
pute further up the NSC ladder with Under Secretary Richardson's
recommendation accompanied by position papers from the dissent-
ing agencies.
In the month and a half immediately after the Under Secretaries
Committee meeting, the Defense Department and its supporters
mounted a particularly vigorous campaign against the State De-
partment position. In response to these objections and in his
capacity as Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee, Elliott
Richardson proposed a fourth policy position on the Continental
Shelf boundary and the seabed regime. The new position was an
obvious compromise between the State Department position on an
intermediate zone and the Defense Department position in favor
of a narrow Continental Shelf. In his proposal Richardson sug-
gested that the concept of the intermediate zone be retained but
that the zone be expressly incorporated into the international re-
gime. The proposal went on to stipulate that, within the interme-
diate zone, the coastal state would have the exclusive right to grant
concessions and to collect royalties as a "trustee" of the interna-
tional community. Substantial royalties from exploitation in the
zone would be allocated to international economic development.
Richardson's proposal differed from the original State Department
position on the outer limit of the national Continental Shelf bound-
ary and the size of royalties to be allocated to the international
community. It promptly superseded the earlier State Department
proposal as the new official State Department position.
The reactions of both Defense and Interior to the revised State
Department position were revealing. The Defense Department
continued to prefer its own concept of preferential bidding rights
for coastal nations, but it deemed the new proposal acceptable as
a "fall-back" position since it explicitly stipulated that national
21. For a description of the role and stature of the Under Secretaries
Committee in the National Security Council Committee hierarchy, see:
Smith, Foreign Policy: Kissinger at Hub, New York Times, Jan. 19, 1971,
at 1; Reston, The Kissinger Role, New York Times, March 3, 1971, at 39.
sovereignty would end at the 200 meter isobath and concentrated
its efforts on assuring the international character of the trustee-
ship zone. The Interior Department was far less sanguine about
Mr. Richardson's proposal. Interior's main objection was to the
provisions that would give the international community discretion-
ary authority in the intermediate zone and would only allow the
coastal state to act as "trustee." Such authority would mean that
the international community, of which developing nations consti-
tute a majority, would have the power to decide upon and to
impose production controls, to fix high royalty payments, to im-
pose other onerous restrictions upon the coastal state, or to exclude
the coastal state altogether from its trusteeship zone. Finally, the
Interior Department expressed concern that the Richardson pro-
posal, unlike its predecessor in the State Department, called for a
large amount in royalties to be paid to an international fund. The
Interior Department urged, therefore, a return to the abandoned
State Department position on the Shelf boundary and a seabed
regime.
With the formulation of the Richardson proposal and the reten-
tion of the original State Department proposal at the insistence of
Interior, there were four policy options to be considered by the
White House.22 Although these were sent to the President in
March, no decision on the options was forthcoming until the end
of May. An obvious cause of the delay was the fact that the Con-
tinental Shelf/seabed regime issue had to compete with more
urgent matters for the time and attention of busy presidential
advisors. The invasion of Cambodia is a case in point. A more
fundamental source of delay, however, was the difficulty for White
House officials of mastering the complex technical and legal issues
of the seabed question. Mr. Kissinger was particularly reluctant
to involve himself in a subject with which he had little experience.
Hence the problem was shoved aside.
This state of affairs might have persisted indefinitely had not
other parts of the White House intervened in the agency dispute.
Because the Continental Shelf/seabed regime problem spans do-
mestic as well as foreign policy considerations, Interior Depart-
ment officials directly solicited the support of John Ehrlichman,
the President's advisor for domestic affairs. Unlike Mr. Kissinger,
22. On the agency positions that were considered by the President, see:
Landauer, Nixon Is Urged to Yield Some Ocean Floor Oil to Help the
World's Poor, Wall Street Journal, March 27, 1970, at 1; Hearings, pt. II
399; Orr, Domestic Pressures Quicken U.S. Policy-Making on Seabed Juris-
diction, C.P.R. IN'L J. 676, March, 1970.
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Mr. Ehrlichman was quite prepared to take a position on this ques-
tion after an initial briefing by Interior Department officials. Mr.
Ehrlichman was concerned that an Executive branch policy in sup-
port of a narrow Continental Shelf would expose the President to
the politically damaging claim of "giving away" the nation's min-
eral estate. Therefore, Ehrlichman opted for either the Interior
Department or the original State Department position. Officials of
the National Security Council received Mr. Ehrlichman's interven-
tion in a matter of foreign policy with less than complete enthu-
siasm. NSC officials were concerned that American strategic inter-
ests would be gravely endangered by the wide Continental Shelf
policies of the Interior and original State Department positions.
Thus the lines were firmly drawn between the President's foreign
and domestic affairs advisors and the issue was once again stalled.28
External events, however, combined to force strenuous efforts
within the White House to negotiate a mutually acceptable options
paper for the President. While the U.N. Seabed Committee was
pressing ahead with its deliberations, a growing number of coun-
tries were laying claim to extensive offshore jurisdiction-Brazil
to a 200 mile territorial sea and Canada to a 100 mile pollution
safety zone.24 At the same time, news of the interagency dispute
was leaking to Congress and the press. 25 The Senate Interior and
Insular Affairs Committee was threatening to hold hearings which
would have exposed the interagency dispute and to issue a report
on its own in the absence of a prompt Presidential decision.26
23. Hearings, pt. H, at 399. On the operation of these two power cen-
ters in the White House, see: Semple, Nixon's Style as Boss Combines
Desire for Order and Solitude, New York Times, Jan. 12, 1970, at 1.
24. Secret Crisis, Wall Street Journal, March 20, 1970, at 1.
25. Examples include: Oceans of Oil, Nat. Observer, - (1970); Lan-
dauer, supra note 22; Orr, supra note 22.
26. Unwilling to have the agency dispute aired publicly, the White House
sent John Whittaker to ask Senator Metcalf for more time to reach a uni-
fied Government position. Senator Metcalf agreed to postpone the hearings
from April 8 to April 22. The intra-White House disagreement, however,
was not easily resolved and on April 17, Senator Metcalf was once again
asked to delay the hearings. The Senator agreed but made it clear that in
the absence of a Presidential decision, his Subcommittee would issue a
report on its own. In a letter dated April 28, Kenneth BeLieu, Deputy
Assistant to the President, pledged that the Administration would present
a unified position to the subcommittee on May 27. Senator Metcalf speak-
ing on the Seaward Limit of our Legal Continental Shelf, Hearings, pt. I1
at 423.
The challenge, therefore, was to prepare an options memoran-
dum for the President that was acceptable to both Ehrlichman and
Kissinger. The NSC staff drafted a series of memorandum for
review and comment by the domestic affairs staff. Of paramount
concern to Mr. Ehrlichman in the first drafts was the NSC's omis-
sion of the original State Department position as one of the options
to go to the President. It was that position, in Mr. Ehrlichman's
view, that offered the best compromise between domestic and for-
eign policy considerations. The Defense Department position did
not ensure national control over the valuable petroleum resources
of the U.S. continental margin. The Interior Department position,
on the other hand, ignored the problem of creeping jurisdiction.
And, in a contest between the Richardson and the first State De-
partment positions, Mr. Ehrlichman preferred the latter since it
recognized the inherent legal rights of states to the resources of
their continental margins.
The Ehrlichman views were taken into account in the final ver-
sion of the option paper that was sent to the President over Mr.
Kissinger's signature at the end of April. The NSC staff, however,
was responsible for the structuring of the memorandum, giving it
an obvious advantage in determining the President's decision.
After setting out the four agency positions and their rationales and
after explaining Mr. Ehrlichman's support for the original State
Department, the Kissinger memorandum concluded with the rec-
ommendation that the President choose the Defense or the Rich-
ardson option. The Richardson position thereby became the ob-
vious middle position, and it was that policy that was ultimately
adopted by the President.
Following months of delay while the issue made its way to the
White House, the President's decision was taken after only brief
consideration and on the basis of a carefully constructed set of
options. Once President Nixon selected the Richardson option, the
"NSC system" again took over. In cooperation with the State
Department, the victorious agency, the NSC staff drafted a Na-
tional Security Decision Memorandum conveying the President's
decision to the heads of all interested federal agencies. The NSDM
not only outlined the principles that were to govern a prospective
treaty to be submitted to the United Nations Seabed Committee,
but it also specified that the State Department would be respon-
sible for preparing the treaty, the U.S. negotiating position, and the
necessary legislative measures, in coordination with the Depart-
ments of Defense and Interior.
The stipulation that the State Department coordinate its efforts
[VOL. 10: 467, 1973] United States Oceans Politics
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
to negotiate a Seabed Treaty with both Interior and Defense
merely confirmed the fact that the NSC system reserved all critical
foreign policy issues for White House decision. From the time of
the June 1969 National Security Study Memorandum, the State
Department had been effectively precluded from making an inde-
pendent decision on the seabed regime without the agreement of
all affected agencies. The January 1970 meeting of the Under
Secretaries Committee was simply one further step in the progress
of the decision to the White House. Elliot Richardson, Chairman
of the Committee, did not have the authority under the NSC sys-
tem to impose a decision. His recommendation simply went to the
President as one of several options advanced by the dissenting
agencies. The options as they reached the President were care-
fully structured and articulated by Mr. Kissinger and his staff,
with the intervention in this instance of Mr. Ehrlichman. At the
top of the pyramid was the President, advised by Mr. Kissinger to
adopt the Richardson or the Defense option. The success of the
Richardson position lay as much in its presentation as in its intrin-
sic merit or persuasiveness. No doubt Mr. Kissinger's and Mr.
Nixon's personal rapport with Mr. Richardson also played an im-
portant role in their choice.
While the NSC options system reserved the key or disputed ocean
policy decisions for the White House, the implementation of those
decisions was left to lower level bureaucrats. Important power,
thereby, remained in the hands of the technicians who had mas-
tered the complex legal, geological, strategic and economic ocean
issues.
The Presidents Seabed Policy
With the issuance of the May 22 NSDM, the task of announcing
and implementing the President's decision returned to the bureau-
cracy. The "President's seabed policy" was announced by John
Stevenson, the Legal Advisor, and Ronald Zeigler at a White House
press conference on May 23.27 The public was told that the Presi-
dent was calling for the renunciation of national claims to seabed
resources beyond the depth of 200 meters and for the establishment,
27. White House Press Release, News Conference #607; also in, 62 DEPT.
STATE BULL., - (1970).
beyond this point, of an international regime to govern the exploi-
tation of seabed resources. Two types of machinery would be
created to authorize resource exploitation in this international sea-
bed area. To the edge of the continental margin, an area called the
"trusteeship zone," the coastal state would administer exploitation
as a trustee for the international community. In return the "coastal
state would receive a share of the international revenues from the
zone in which it acts as trustee." Beyond the continental margin,
international machinery would authorize and regulate exploitation
and would collect "substantial mineral royalties" to be used for
economic assistance to developing countries. In addition the inter-
national regime would formulate "rules to prevent unreasonable
interference with other uses of the ocean, to protect the ocean from
pollution, to assure the integrity of the investment necessary for
such exploitation, and to provide for peaceful and compulsory set-
tlement of disputes."
The May 23 statement, Elliot Richardson informed the Congress,
represented only an initial "approach to dealing with the exploi-
tation of the continental margin." The President promised that the
Executive would introduce more specific proposals at the U.N. Sea-
bed Committee meeting scheduled in August 1970.28 On August 3,
the first day of the session, the United States presented a "United
Nations Draft Convention on the International Seabed Area." Five
officials from the Departments of State, Defense and Interior had
drafted the seventy-eight articles and five appendices of the Con-
vention. The ad hoc drafting committee included Bernard Oxman,
of the Legal Advisor's Office, chairman, Louis Sohn and Stuart
McIntyre of the State Department, Leigh Ratiner of the Defense
Department, and Vincent McKelvey of the Interior Department.
This lengthy and complex document, rather than the President's
May 23 statement, quickly became the focus of domestic opposition
to a narrow offshore resource zone. While the President's an-
nounced decision was not considered a legitimate object of attack,
its implementation in the draft Convention was.
Even before its presentation at the Seabed Committee, private
industry,2 9 the Congress30 and the Interior Department had stren-
28. Hearings, pt. 31, at 30-35.
29. In the week of July 9-14 representatives of the National Petroleum
Council, American Petroleum Institute, Standard of New Jersey, Kenne-
cott Copper, Union Carbide, and Deep Sea Ventures met with the drafting
committee to review early versions of the draft treaty. Most vocal in its
opposition to its provisions was the petroleum industry. 12 OcEAu SciaIcE
NEws, 1 (1970).
30. On June 29 Senator Metcalf requested that a copy of the draft
treaty be sent to his Subcommittee and subsequently expressed grave
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uously opposed many of the draft treaty's provisions and had suc-
ceeded in securing some modifications. Then with the draft treaty's
tabling at the Geneva meeting, the domestic contention over the
extent of the Continental Shelf merged with United Nations debate
over the breadth of an economic resource zone.
U.S. TERTORIAL SEA, STRis Am Fis=mHEs POLICY
The principal strategy behind the U.S. seabed proposal was to
encourage other nations to adopt a narrow Continental Shelf policy.
It was also hoped, at least by Defense Department officials, that the
seabed proposal would have a positive effect on separate negotia-
tions then underway regarding the breadth of the territorial sea,
international straits and fisheries. The territorial sea, straits and
fisheries issues had been linked together since 1967 and 1968 when
they were first discussed with the Soviet Government and then
with U.S. and Soviet allies. Within each Government agency the
issues had been handled as a package by a group of officials distinct
from that dealing with seabed policy.
Among the three issues, those of strategic importance-straits
and the territorial sea-were accorded primacy. Fisheries was in-
corporated within the policy package as a tradeoff for concessions
on straits and territorial sea and because there was no policy objec-
tion raised by the fishing industry.31 The United States position
announced in 1970 was that it was prepared to recognize a twelve
mile territorial sea only if freedom of transit through and over
international straits were to be guaranteed by international agree-
ment.32 If the breadth of the territorial sea were universally ex-
doubts to Secretary of State Rogers about many of its provisions. The
Subcommittee urged that it be revised and not be presented at Geneva.
In an effort to accommodate these objections, officials from the Depart-
ments of State, Defense and Interior met in executive session on July 27
with members of the Subcommittee. Recommendations made in the text
of the draft included a downward revision of the percentage of fees to
be paid to the international trusteeship area, the reduction of status of
the draft treaty to a working paper, and the addition of a stipulation that
the appendices were included solely by way of example. Hearings, pt. II,
at 25; Orr, Soviet, Latin Opposition Blocks Agreement on Seabeds Treaty,
C.P.R. NAT'L J. 197, Sept. 1970; The U.S. Should Not Present a Seabed Treaty
at Geneva, 12 OcEAN ScIENcE NEWS 1 (1970).
31. Loring, The United States-Peurvian 'Fisheries' Dispute, 23 STAN.
L. REv. 429 (1971).
32. Address by John R. Stevenson to Philadelphia Bar Association and
tended to twelve miles, 116 international straits would be covered
by territorial waters. In these straits high seas corridors would
cease to exist and transit would be subject to the regime of inno-
cent passage. To avoid the application of coastal state discretion
to these vessels, it was necessary to guarantee the right of freedom
of transit.
Although the Soviets adopted a twelve mile territorial sea in
1927, they have since become a maritime power with global inter-
ests. They have therefore fully supported the U.S. position on
freedom of transit through and over international straits. The in-
terests of the Japanese and Soviets, however, diverge from those
of the United States over fisheries. The second and third largest
fishing nations of the world, respectively, the Japanese and Soviets
were not in accord with the preferential fishing rights the United
States was prepared to grant to coastal nations dependent on their
coastal fisheries. United States proposals on fishing, however, were
designed to appease coastal rather than distant water fishing inter-
ests. By the late 1960's nine Latin American nations had claimed
zones of 200 miles to protect fishery resources off their shores. To
halt the trend toward such claims and to induce these nations to
roll back established claims, the United States proposed that spe-
cial preferential rights over offshore living resources be granted to
coastal nations. According to the concept of preferential rights, a
coastal fishing nation would be able to reserve a portion of the
catch off its shores for its own fishermen.33 The amount would be
determined by the coastal state's economic dependence on or extent
of investment in offshore fisheries. At the insistence of the De-
partment of Defense, this proposal deliberately avoided the con-
cept of a fishing zone that might subsequently evolve into a fixed
area of expanded coastal state jurisdiction.3 4
Among fishing nations, the United States ranks sixth, and it
fishes off its own coasts as well as those of other nations. U.S. pro-
posals with regard to preferential rights, therefore, were not detri-
mental to all U.S. fishing interests. They were, however, primarily
determined by external rather than domestic considerations-by
the need to balance Soviet and Japanese distant water fishing
Philadelphia World Affairs Council, Feb. 18, 1970, 62 DEPr. STATS BULL.
314 (1970); 62 DEPT. STATS BULL. 343 (1970); U.S. Department of Defense,
"United States Policy with Respect to Territorial Seas", Department of
Defense Press Release, February 25, 1970.
33. Ratiner, United States Ocean Policy: An Analysis, J. oF MARiTIME L,
Am Comm. 248 (1971).
34. Hearings on Territorial Sea Boundaries Before a Subcomm. on Sea-
power of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 9291
(1970).
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interests with the coastal interests of developing countries and by
the need to persuade the latter to accept a twelve mile territorial
sea and freedom of transit through straits.
Reasons for the early lack of policy input by the U.S. fishing
industry were twofold. First, the fishing industry, unlike the
petroleum industry, simply lacked the knowledge that discussions
were underway within and between governments and that the
Department of Defense was determining the fisheries position in
exchange for concessions on straits and the territorial sea. The
second problem hampering industry policy input was that of inter-
nal differences within the industry between coastal and distant
water fishing interests. With the public announcement of U.S.
policy on straits, territorial seas, and fisheries of February 18, 1970,
the industry was first apprised of governmental discussions. Al-
though the Stevenson reference to preferential rights was quite
sketchy in his speech to the Philadelphia Bar Association, it was
sufficient to alarm the distant water fishing segments of the U.S.
fishing industry. The reaction of the distant water fishermen to
the preferential rights approach was analogous to that of the Soviet
Union and Japan. The U.S. coastal fishermen, on the other hand,
shared the interests of developing coastal countries in obtaining
preferential rights to offshore resources. Neither segment of the
industry, however, appreciated being excluded from the policy
deliberations. Despite intra-industry differences, they recognized
that if they were to have a say in determining U.S. fisheries policy,
they would have to act in concert.35
The first sign of a tenuous resolution of industry differences was
visible in the adoption of the "species approach" presented by the
U.S. Government to the U.N. Seabed Committee on August 3,
1971.36 In this approach, the concept of preferential rights for the
coastal state was applied only to stocks that were adjacent to the
coast or that spawned in fresh water. Highly migratory oceanic
stocks were excluded, thereby protecting the U.S. tuna fleets fish-
35. 117 CONG. REc. 21,155 (daily ed. Dec. 13, ,1971) (remarks of Senator
Hatfield); 117 CoNG. REC. 19,908 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1971) (remarks of
Senator Hatfield); 117 CoNG. REc. 13,076 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1971) (remarks
of Congressman Pell.
36. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.4 (30 July 1971); 10 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALs 1018 (1971).
ing off the west coast of Latin America. The U.S. proposed that
the actual fishing capacity of a coastal state be used to determine
the extent of its preferential rights in an offshore fishery. As that
capacity expanded, so would its preferential rights. This posed an
obvious problem with regard to phasing out other national fishing
efforts in the area. In its approach to historic fishing rights, the
U.S. "species approach" of 1971 resembled the 1970 U.S. seabed pro-
posal. Both envisioned a strong role for international and regional
organizations in the regulation of high seas resources in order to
reduce pressure for unilateral extension of coastal state control
over offshore resources. Provisions for international cooperation
in the U.S. fishing proposal included inspection and dispute settle-
ment as well as joint conservation measures to prevent overfishing.
Only if all other measures failed was unilateral state action deemed
acceptable.
The elaboration of the species approach in the U.S. August 1971
statement was one facet of a speech dealing with international
straits and territorial seas as well. Whereas the fisheries segment
of the speech showed an evolution from previous statements and
reflected an increased industry input, the straits and territorial
waters position remained essentially unchanged reflecting a con-
sistent Defense Department support for these policies. The United
States was prepared to accept a twelve mile limit if the right of
free transit were provided for all vessels and aircraft through
and over international straits overlapped by territorial seas. Mr.
Stevenson stressed that free transit was a "limited but vital right"
and added that the right was merely one of "transiting the straits,
not of conducting any other activities." In a further elaboration of
U. S. views, Stevenson stipulated that the coastal state could desig-
nate corridors suitable for transit, and international traffic safety
regulations would be agreed upon. The right of a vessel to transit,
however, could not be left to the discretion of a coastal state.
UNiTED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
The linking of the issues of straits, territorial sea and fisheries
in the U.S. statement of August 3, 1971, reflected the official U.S.
policy of keeping Continental Shelf and seabed issues separate
from the other law of the sea questions. The Government thereby
hoped to preserve its packages of tradeoffs-a narrow Continental
Shelf for a generous seabed regime and freedom of transit through
and over international straits in exchange for a twelve mile terri-
torial sea with preferential coastal state fishing rights in the area
beyond.
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In the course of 1971 and 1972 this division of issues, and the
tradeoffs thereby implied, gradually broke down.37 A combination
of pressures was working against the official U.S. grouping of trade-
offs. First, domestic interests were becoming more active in the
formulation of ocean policy. As the involvement of these domestic
industries increased, the priority formerly accorded U.S. strategic
considerations over resource interests decreased. Secondly, and at
cross purposes with domestic pressures, foreign nations were press-
ing for a single international conference to handle all law of the
sea issues.38 Developing countries were hopeful that by combining
and trading on all law of the sea questions, they would gain greater
concessions from the maritime nations.
The Domestic Perspective
U.S. bureaucratic machinery for ocean issues was consolidated in
early 1970. Separate staffs for Continental Shelf and seabed issues
on the one hand and straits, territorial seas and fisheries on the
other were merged into single offices in the Departments of State,
Defense and Interior. A central policy body designated as the
Inter-Agency Law of the Sea Task Force was officially established
on February 4 and held its first meeting on February 17 under the
chairmanship of John Stevenson. Mr. Stevenson also headed the
Delegation to the U. N. Seabed Committee. The Inter-Agency Task
Force comprises representatives of all affected Federal agencies
and bureaus including the Departments of State, Defense, Interior,
Commerce, Treasury, Justice, Transportation, the National Secu-
rity Council, the National Science Foundation, the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, the Office of Management and Budget, and the U.S.
Mission to the United Nations.
37. As noted above, the division of issues was not always observed in
practice by policy participants. When Defense Department officials
pressed for a generous seabed regime to encourage acceptance of a narrow
Continental Shelf, they hoped at the same time to discourage other coastal
state extensions of jurisdiction and to have the straits proposal favorably
received.
38. G.A. Res. 2574 A (XXIV) (1969), called on the Secretary General
to poll the membership on the desirability of calling a conference to discuss
all law of the sea regimes. Opposed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union,
it passed by a vote of 65 in favor, 12 opposed and 30 abstaining. G.A.
Res. 2750C (XXV) (1970), 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 224 (1971), called
for a third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea and identified seabed,
straits, territorial seas and fisheries issues as potential agenda items.
In response to strong industry pressure, an Advisory Committee
on the Law of the Sea was formed in early 1972. The official pur-
pose of the Advisory Committee has been to advise the head of the
United States Delegation to the U.N. Seabed Committee. The
membership of sixty is divided into eight subcommittees: petro-
leum, hard minerals, international law and relations, marine sci-
ence, fisheries, international finance and taxation, marine environ-
ment, and maritime industries. One member each from the petro-
leum, hard minerals, marine science and international law and
relations subcommittees and two from the fisheries subcommitte
are given official status on the U.S. delegation to each session of
the U.N. Seabed Committee. The marine environment subcom-
mittee was officially represented for the first time at the July-
August 1973 session. Through this institutional structure and by
means of additional pressures through Congressional hearings and
legislation and informal contacts, each of the industry interest
groups has sought to make its interests felt and to participate
actively in the policy process.
The effect on the military interest of the increased participation
of other interests has been to circumscribe the ease with which
Defense Department officials had heretofore furthered strategic
interests by determining policy in other areas. Whereas the mili-
tary previously intervened in seabed as well as fisheries policy, it
is largely restricted to policy inputs relating directly to military
mobility-that is to straits and territorial sea boundaries affecting
navigation. This not only results from the increased policy partic-
ipation by other interests but is also in keeping with extensive
changes in Defense Department personnel. Responsibility for law
of the sea policy in the Defense Department lies no longer with the
Legal Office but is officially vested in the International Security
Agency. In keeping with overall trends in the Nixon Administra-
tion's Defense Department, the military has reasserted its suprem-
acy over civilian offices handling law of the sea questions and the
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff plays an active role in decision-
making.
Substantial changes have also occurred in the policy behavior of
the other major protagonist over the Continental Shelf boundary,
the petroleum industry. After a strong blast at the 1970 U.S. Draft
Treaty on the Seabed, the petroleum industry lapsed into virtual
silence on the subject of the seabed regime and the boundaries of
national jurisdiction. That silence was first broken in the NPC's
summary report on the "U.S. Energy Outlook" of December 1972.
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Under recommendations for a U.S. Energy Policy the NPC suggests
that "... any proposed international treaty dealing with seabed
mineral resources should confirm the jurisdiction of coastal nations
over. . . the mineral resources of the entire submerged continental
mass off their coasts."39 In this recommendation, the NPC no
longer insists that national jurisdiction over these resources is "ex-
clusive" and no longer calls for an immediate unilateral U. S. dec-
laration of jurisdiction. Instead the NPC recommends that an
international treaty ". . . should provide for security of investment
made in resource development in areas of the continental margin
pursuant to agreement with or license from the coastal state." To
assure these investments, the NPC recommends referral of disputes
in the area ". . to an international tribunal for compulsory objec-
tive decision." Support for international agreement on compulsory
dispute settlement for the continental margin is a significant move
away from the notion of exclusive coastal state jurisdiction, al-
though it is still far from acceptance of a strong international au-
thority in the area.
This shift in industry position, however limited, may be traced
in large measure to the rapidly changing international and domestic
environment in which petroleum policy is formulated. A major
shift in the international environment has been the growing diffi-
culty of dealing with producing nations that operate as a bloc
through the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC). OPEC successes in increasing the revenues to producing
countries, buttressed by threats of expropriation, have no doubt
undermined earlier industry confidence that it is safer and more
profitable to deal bilaterally with foreign governments than with
an international regime.
The domestic environment of petroleum policy has also shifted
with the advent of the recently discovered "energy crisis." Given
present projections of U.S. petroleum demand and domestic supply,
it is more difficult to assert that the United States must have juris-
diction over its entire continental margin. Estimated reserves off
the U.S. alone do not begin to satisfy the projected demand for
energy. In the future, the United States will be importing vast
quantities of petroleum from the margins as well as continents of
39. N.P.C. Sumn REP., U.S. ENERGY OuTLooK, at 79 (Dec. 1972).
other nations. This raises the question for petroleum policy of
whether those imported supplies would be more secure if they were
recovered from areas controlled by an international regime, or
from areas under national jurisdiction.
An additional policy complication stemming from the "energy
crisis" relates to petroleum shipping: with increased imports to
the U.S., the petroleum industry will be in the same proverbial
boat as the military. Greater quantities of petroleum will be
shipped across the world's oceans and through the world's straits.
Like the military, the petroleum industry will be adversely affected
by coastal state pollution and resource controls that threaten to
hinder navigation or restrict straits transit. Canadian legislation
on Arctic waters effectively closing the northwest passage to the
Manhattan is a sample of pollution restrictions that may be ex-
pected in the future.
As the ocean interests of the petroleum industry become more
diverse, a single policy is increasingly difficult to elaborate.
Whereas domestic sectors of the major petroleum companies for-
merly determined ocean policy in cooperation with the Interior
Department and its National Petroleum Council, the major firms
and more international sectors of the industry, with close relations
to the Department of State, are playing an increasing role. The
involvement of new segments of the industry has been reflected in
changes in personnel-the disappearance of the colorful, outspoken
oil man lobbying conspicuously through the Interior Department
and the appearance of the oil diplomat, working skillfully and
quietly with the Department of State. It is also apparent in the
willingness evidenced by the industry to accommodate its shipping
interests to reasonable coastal state pollution controls.
Since the beginning of U.N. negotiations on the seabed, the hard
minerals industry has also adjusted its ocean policy to a changing
domestic and international environment. By 1971, several mining
firms were making substantial investments in developing technol-
ogy for the recovery of manganese nodules. Surprised by the far
reaching provisions of the U. S. Draft Seabed Treaty, the industry
responded with a vigorous approach to the U. S. Congress. The
American Mining Congress, at the request of Senator Metcalf,
drafted legislation for a seabed regime that would be more congen-
ial to mining interests. Introduced originally as S. 2801 on No-
vember 2, 1971 (H. R. 13904, March 20, 1972), the bill lapsed with
the 92nd Congress. Identical legislation, however, has already been
reintroduced in the 93rd Congress (H.R. 9, January 3, 1973; S. 1134,
[VOL. 10: 467, 1973] United States Oceans Politics
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEV
March 8, 1973).40 The industry-sponsored legislation would au-
thorize U. S. firms to mine the deep seabed under a national licens-
ing system until the establishment of an international regime. It
provides for reciprocal recognition of similar practice by other
countries and for the establishment of a fund drawn from income
taxes with aid directed to less developed reciprocating states.
Opposition to this legislation has been voiced, both domestically
and internationally. Much of the domestic protest centers on the
provisions for a U. S. Government guarantee to reimburse the li-
censee for any loss of investment or for increased costs incurred in
a forty year period after issuance of the license resulting from re-
quirements or limitations imposed by a subsequently agreed inter-
national regime. Foreign as well as domestic opponents point out,
moreover, that enactment of this legislation could prejudge the
character of the international regime to be established through
negotiations in the Seabed Committee. Concern over such an out-
come is increased by knowledge that in the absence of timely agree-
ment on a suitable international regime, the State Department
would begin at once to formulate a legislative approach on a con-
tingency basis 41
The increased attention devoted to the problems of the mining
industry is reflected in the number of Congressional hearings42 and
the corresponding inputs required of the Executive branch. The
resources and attention of Interior Department officials which
were formerly devoted to petroleum are now largely concentrated
on the hard minerals industry. This is due to a combination of
factors: the advent of new Interio Department personnel, the
shift away from Interior of petroleum industry attention, the em-
phasis on the deep ocean floor as opposed to the continental margin,
and the heightened concern of the hard minerals industry and its
40. See Laylin, The Law to Govern Deep Sea Mining Until Superseded
by International Agreement, 10 SAN DiEGO L. REV. 433 (1973); Knight, The
Deep Seabed Mineral Resources Act..A Negative View, 10 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 446 (1973); Appendix A thereto, 10 SA- DIEGO L. REv. 461 (1973).
41. Letter from Charles N. Brower to Senator Fulbright, March 1, 1973,
p. 5.
42. House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Comn., May, 1972; Senate
Interior and Insular Affairs Comm., June, 1972; Senate Commerce Comm.,
October, 1972; House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Comm., March 1 and
April 3, 1973; House Foreign Affairs Comm., March 21 and March 27, 1973.
Congressional allies with the direction of U. S. Government policy
in the law of the sea negotiations.
The fishing industry is also faring better than it was in 1971 and
it too has resorted to Congressional backing to gain a voice in the
ocean policy process. Using Congressional leverage, the industry
was accorded two seats on the U. S. Delegation to the U. N. Seabed
Committee. While the extra seat reflects sharp industry differ-
ences between coastal, distant water and anadromous interests, the
desire for a policy input has on the other hand buttressed the alli-
ance of U. S. fishing groups. This precarious coalition, maintained
through frequent, albeit heated, meetings, played a direct role in
the policy shift from a preferential rights approach to the species
approach currently espoused by the U. S. Government. The dura-
bility of the present species approach, however, is uncertain given
strong coastal fishing pressures, both domestic and foreign, toward
the adoption of a 200 mile resource zone. The New England Gov-
ernors Conference called for 200 mile legislation in 1971 and several
states have since unilaterally enacted such measures.43 Through
Congressional and state activities, the industry has acquired a voice
in policy. It has also cemented relations with appropriate Execu-
tive agencies: the State Department's Special Assistant to the
Secretary for Fisheries and Wildlife and Commerce Department's
National Marine Fisheries Service located in NOAA.
Brief mention must be made of the evolving marine science input
into ocean policy. With thd creation in 1972 of a Freedom of
Science Task Force within the Ocean Affairs Board of the National
Academy of Science, the marine scientist first began to take a
regular and direct part in the policy process. The support of
prestigious domestic and international scientific bodies was enlisted
and the scientific interest made its needs felt regularly through its
advisory seat on the U.S. delegation to the U. N. Seabed Com-
mittee. Then in 1973, the marine scientist gained a full-time
representative with the National Science Foundation's creation of
a position to represent marine science within the Government and
on the U. S. Delegation. In addition, the State Department's
Coordinator of Ocean Affairs continues to represent the scientific
interest.
Coincident with the full time participation of the National
Science Foundation in law of the sea negotiations at the March/
April 1973 session has been the renewed interest of the Depart-
43. SPoRT FisHING INs-ETuTE, SF Bu r., Marine Fisheries and Law of the
Sea, at 1, Nov.-Dec., 1972.
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ments of Transportation and Treasury. Transportation officials
are concerned with non-military ocean transport and the U. S.
Coast Guard's interests. The Treasury Department view, going
beyond revenue considerations, is that overall U. S. ocean policy
must be based on sound economic concepts and must take into ac-
count benefits to the economy as a whole.
The net effect of the direct policy input of all interests affected
by ocean policy is difficult to discern at present. An early result,
visible first in U. S. statements made at the August 1972 session, was
a trend toward parity between the several U. S. interests-most
notably between strategic and resource interests. While there
had been no change in the firm U. S. position on straits and ter-
ritorial sea breadth, Mr. Stevenson's August 10 speech laid a new
emphasis on the national interest in ocean resources. Also at the
August 1972 session (only a year after the U. S. had introduced an
early version of the species approach stressing international regula-
tion of all fishing) the Government indicated that it was prepared
to move toward coastal state management of coastal and anadrom-
ous species.
Similarly, with regard to mineral resources, the U. S. position
has evolved toward a coastal state approach as a result of more
direct interest group involvement. Most significantly, the Govern-
ment no longer contemplates limiting national jurisdiction to the 200
meter isobath. In response to strong domestic and international
pressures in favor of a broad Continental Shelf or some form of eco-
nomic resource zone, there was movement in the 1972 United
States position toward accepting an intermediate zone of juris-
diction. Although the U. S. Government has not submitted any
articles officially superseding the August 1970 draft treaty position
on the Continental Shelf and seabed regime, a careful reading of
subsequent U. S. policy statements reveals a changed attitude.
In an area extending to the outer edge of the continental margin
or to some agreed distance from shore, the United States now says
that it is prepared to accept coastal state regulation of the ex-
ploitation of mineral resources subject to international standards
and compulsory settlement of disputes. Other uses of the area
are not to be restricted and pollution controls are to be internation-
ally determined. Revenues from seabed resources would be shared
with the international community and foreign investment in the
area would be protected from expropriation.
Statements made at the March/April 1973 session in New York
elaborated existing positions. This may have been due in part to
the retirement of John Stevenson from Government and the result-
ing need for his successors to reaffirm continuity in the U.S. posi-
tion. John Norton Moore replaced Mr. Stevenson as head of the
delegation while Charles Brower chaired the Inter-Agency Task
Force on Law of the Sea. With the active participation of all ocean
users, further concessions or developments in U.S. policy have been
difficult at best. Given the very limited advances in the work of
the U.N. Seabed Committee, moreover, the Conference still appears
too distant to warrant the sacrifice of some domestic interests for
others. This situation remains highly fluid and might alter signifi-
cantly by the summer session of the Seabed Committee in 1973. At
that meeting, new U.S. representatives will be present and increased
policy inputs by the agencies newly active-NSF, Transportation
and Treasury-may be expected. Mr. Stevenson will again head
the U.S. delegation and Mr. Moore will chair the Inter-Agency Task
Force.
International Perspective
The response of other governments to the seeming parity among
U.S. interests and to any policy shifts caused by new actors is dif-
ficult to predict. The negotiations are at an early stage where each
delegate is seeking to discover which interests other delegations are
or are not willing to compromise. Indeed a major purpose for
developing countries of combining all law of the sea issues in a
single conference was to increase the pressure for tradeoffs on the
maritime nations. By the August 1972 session of the Seabed Com-
mittee, the developing nations had succeeded in expanding the con-
ference agenda to twenty-five subjects. 44 In the face of apparently
increasing parity among U.S. interests, however, the negotiations
will have to proceed much further before international pressures
for compromise will result in the sacrifice of some facets of the
U.S. position for the retention of others.
The success of developing nations in expanding the number of
44. In addition to the standard items of straits, territorial seas, fisheries,
the seabed regime, marine pollution and scientific research, some of the
new items include: land-locked countries, rights and interests of states with
broad shelves, rights and interests of shelf-locked states and states with
narrow shelves or short coastlines, regional arrangements, high seas,
archipelagos, enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, artificial islands and in-
stallations, the development and transfer of technology, dispute settle-
ment, zones of peace and security, archaeological and historial treasures
on the ocean floor and peaceful uses of ocean space.
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agenda items to be considered by the Conference may prove the
greatest obstacle to the progress of negotiations and ultimately to
the Conference itself. How the diverse agenda items will be pro-
cedurally considered remains in doubt as the last preparatory ses-
sion of the Conference begins in Geneva in July.
As of the March/April preparatory session, Subcommittees I
and III of the Seabed Committee were considering the seabed re-
gime and machinery, marine pollution and scientific research. All
other agenda items (such as the territorial sea, economic zone, pref-
erential rights, straits, fisheries, continental shelf) remained within
the purview of Subcommittee II. While the first and third Sub-
committees established thirty-three member working groups, Sub-
committee II had one ninety-one member working group of the
whole. Because the agenda items in Subcommittee II touch on the
critical issue of the extent of coastal state jurisdiction, no agreement
was possible on dividing the issues among smaller working groups.
And, given the interdependence of the various agenda items, the
work of the other subcommittees on the seabed regime, marine
pollution and scientific research will necessarily be hindered by
delays in the work of Subcommittee I.
Procedural dilemmas, of course, mask political differences. The
slow pace of Seabed Committee negotiations indicates the absence
to date of a willingness and/or ability to find legal formulae that
will adequately secure divergent political interests. Wide dispari-
ties in the member nations and in their resulting ocean interests are
far from reconciled. The early beginnings, however, of such a
reconciliation may be discerned in the draft articles embodying the
Santo Domingo principles on the patrimonial sea and the final docu-
ment of the Inter-American Juridical Committee. Whether the
Seabed Committee can build on these compromises will become
apparent in the July/August preparatory meeting.
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